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THE TROUBLE WITH TARBLE'S:
AN EXCERPT FROMAN ALTERNATIVE
CASEBOOK
Daniel A. Farber*
Ex Parte Printz
521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 138 L. Ed. 2d 914 (1997)**

Chief Justice O'CONNOR delivered the judgment of the
Court and an opinion joined by Justices REHNQUIST,
THOMAS, and KENNEDY, and by Justice SCALIA except for
footnote 1.
[The Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., prohibits
firearms dealers from selling handguns to any person under 21,
to anyone not resident in the dealer's state, to convicted felons,
and to certain others. In 1993, the Brady Act (passed after an
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the President) amended the
statute, imposing a system of "interim" background checks for
purchasers before a system of instant electronic checks goes into
effect. The Brady Act requires a "chief law enforcement officer" to make a "reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business
days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the
law." Printz, a local sheriff, refused to comply with the statute,
and the Attorney General obtained a federal injunction requiring him to do so. When Printz refused to obey the injunction, he
was convicted of criminal contempt and received a three-month
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, University of Minnesota.
** Historical Note. As indicated in Justice Scalia's concurrence in Printz, the "out
of control" state judiciary had become a major conservative agenda issue by 1980. Consequently, President Reagan's appointments to the Court were picked at least partly on
the basis of their nationalist credentials. Indeed, some argued that rejection of Tarble's
was being applied as a litmus test. Although Reagan very nearly selected the more nationalist William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, he apparently concluded that O'Connor,
with her background as a state court judge and legislator, would be more palatable to
moderates. Undoubtedly, her selection as Chief Justice helped defuse some opposition
to the Supreme Court's attack on states' rights.
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sentence. He thereupon filed a petition in state court for a writ
of habeas corpus, which the state courts granted.]
The state courts held that the Brady Act violates the Tenth
Amendment and the guaranty clause of the Constitution. We
reverse without reaching the merits of this claim. Printz relies on
Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), as the basis for state
court jurisdiction. It is true that this Court held in Tarble's Case
that state courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of
federal custody- in that case itself, into whether the ~etitioner
was unlawfully enlisted into the Army while a minor. We do
not have occasion to question that holding today, though it has
been severely criticized by commentators and has been eroded
by recent decisions of this Court. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 459-461 (4th ed.
1996).
Nevertheless, on the facts of this case, it is clear that the
state courts lacked jurisdiction. Inasmuch as Printz is seeking an
unprecedented expansion of an existing constitutional rule, his
habeas petition is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Teague squarely held that a habeas court lacks jurisdiction to
consider a "new rule" of constitutional law. This is just such a
case. 2
The sweeping interpretation of the Tenth Amendment
sought by Printz would unquestionably be a "new rule" under
Teague. The lower courts relied largely on our holding in New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). But as both the plu-

I. The key passage in Chief Justice Chase's opinion for the Court reads as follows:
To deny the right of State courts to issue the writ, or, what amounts to the same
thing, to concede the right to issue and to deny the right to adjudicate, is to deny
the right to protect the citizen by habeas corpus against arbitrary imprisonment
in a large class of cases; and, we arc thoroughly persuaded, was never within the
contemplation of the Convention which framed, or the people who adopted, the
Constitution. That instrument expressly declares that "the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion or in·
vasion, the public safety may require it."
There is some historical evidence that Chase's opinion was originally drafted as a dissent.
2. Unlike Teague, this case involves state rather than federal habeas. Neverthe·
less, Teague rests on the understanding that "[a)pplication of constitutional rule not in
existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." 489 U.S. at 309.
That rationale is fully applicable when a federal conviction is involved, just as it is when a
state conviction is under collateral attack. The same is true for Teague's warning about
the "harm caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants alike," id. at 315, if
the rule were to be nonretroactive except in the specific case in which this Court or any
lower court, state or federal, first announces a new rule of federal law.
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rality opinion by Justice Stevens and the concurring opinion of
Justice White make clear, New York stands at most for the principle that Congress lacks the power to commandeer state legislatures. It would be an extraordinary expansion of New York to
extend this principle to state executive officers, particularly in
the face of substantial evidence that the Framers intended the
state executives to play a central role in enforcing federal law.
See Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev.
1957 (1993).
It surely "would not have been an illogical or even a grudging application" of prior law "to decide that it did not extend to
the facts" of this case. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981). 3 That being true, Teague blocks the use of state collateral review.
Consequently, the judgment of the lower court is reversed
and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Justice SCALIA concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
* * * Power. That is what this suit is about. The allocation
of power among the federal government and the state courts in
such a fashion as to preserve the equilibrium the Constitution
sought to establish. Frequently, an issue of this sort will come
before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of a novel principle to undermine the equilibrium of power is
not apparent and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive
analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf.
Indeed, this is a wolf that has come before, time and again.
Fortunately, the decision in Tarble's Case itself came too late to
affect the course of the civil war. But only a few decades later, it
began to prove its ability to upset the balance of federalism. By
the late 19th Century, labor-oriented state courts were routinely
granting habeas to union leaders jailed for contempt of federal
injunctions. By the middle of the next century, Congress was
finding it difficult to conduct investigations of serious threats to
3. It is true that we have suggested an exception to Teague where the petitioner's
"primary conduct" is immune from government regulation. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989). Here, however, the conduct was contempt of a federal injunction,
which arguably does not qualify as "primary" conduct at all since it took place in the
course of litigation, and in any event is not in itself conduct outside the scope of government regulation, whatever the underlying validity of the injunction.
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our national security, as its contempt orders were met with state
habeas writs issued by judges whose motivations themselves
were, in the eyes of many, suspect. True, those writs were generally reversed by this Court, but not until much valuable time
had been wasted. But worse was to follow. Although previous
war efforts had been too popular to meet resistance from the
state courts, the Vietnam War was different. By 1968, a flurry of
state habeas petitions had begun to interfere seriously with conscription. Several state trial judges held that the war was unconstitutional. These rulings sparked mass demonstrations that led
to the 1969 Paris peace talks, which brought the war to an ignominious end before any of the state decisions reached this Court
4
for review. More recently, some state courts have applied unduly expansive views of the Bill of Rights to overturn federal
criminal convictions, with (sad to say) support from members of
this Court. See William Brennan, State Courts and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535 (1986). Again, the
power of this Court to review the state judgments proved in
practice inadequate as a safeguard. It is little wonder that state
habeas-and the banner of "states' rights" more generally-has
become the darling of certain political forces within our society,
who are unable to muster nationwide majorities for their preferred political positions.5
The dissent has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a jurisdictional
spat. At root, the dispute is between those favoring the orderly
national resolution of political or legal disputes, versus those
who favor an anarchistic riot of local self-determination. The
majority opinion is not the manifestation of a "bare desire torestrict constitutional rights" but is rather a modest attempt to preserve national judicial power against the efforts of a locally pow4. As this history shows, the ultimate ability of this Court to review aberrant state
decisions is cold comfort indeed, particularly given the docket constraints that make it
impossible for us to hear more than a fraction of the cases in which review is granted.
5. Some have even traced Tarble's back to pre-Civil War cases in which state
courts granted habeas to fugitive slaves held in federal custody. See Robert M. Cover,
Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (Yale U. Press, 1975). Such commentators might have found the rule in Tarble's Case a good deal less acceptable, however, had it not been for our decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which
brought an early end to the use of state courts to block federal desegregation decrees.
Cooper recognized an exception to state habeas jurisdiction in cases where the federal
government was acting pursuant to its powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, on
the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment revised the otherwise applicable structure
of federalism and that allowing state interference with federal enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment would conflict with the policy underlying Tarble's, which was intended to protect individual rights through state enforcement, not undermine federal
enforcement of those rights.
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erful majority to undermine that authority through use of the
state courts.
Under the dissent's view, it would now be open season upon
the enforcement powers of the federal courts. The dissent essentially says to the federal government: "Trust the state courts.
They will make sure that you are able to accomplish your constitutional role." I think that the Constitution gives the federal
government-and the people-more protection than that. It is
time to overrule Tarble's Case and bring this sorry aspect of our
nation's history to an end.
Justice STEVENS, joined by Justice SOUTER, Justice
GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER, dissenting.
Poor Printz!
Deprived of his liberty by a federal court enforcing an unconstitutional federal statute, yet with no place to turn for relief
but the same federal courts that issued the injunction-courts
largely manned by judges appointed by the same President and
Congress that passed the law in question.
Unfortunately, the majority turns its back on established
case law and would erect a formidable new barrier to relief.
From the majority's exposition, one might infer that its novel
fabrication will work no great change in the availability of state
habeas. Nothing could be further from the truth. The state
courts are a bulwark of our liberties, as one leading scholar has
aptly observed. See Akhil Amar, Using State Law to Protect
Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions and Answers
About Converse-1983, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 159 (1993). Until today, no question has ever been raised about the power of the
state courts to intervene when Congress oversteps its constitutional powers. But why then, we must ask, did the Supremacy
Clause specifically impose the duty of applying the Constitution
on state judges? For make no mistake: however clear our own
power of judicial review may be, that power is only implied from
the overall structure of the Constitution. But the mandate to the
state courts is explicit and undeniable.
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Our
Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent
succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We must accept our responsibility not
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to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in
light of all of our precedents. Today, the Court again sadly fails
to protect the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own
promise, the promise of liberty, protected by the state judiciary
as well as by this Court itself.
We respectfully dissent.

